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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Iran may have a nuclear weapon soon if Washington and Moscow do not unite to 
slow its efforts.  The collapse of the Soviet Union created new complications in a long 
tradition of nonproliferation cooperation between the United States and Russia, and Iran 
is just one example.  In the 1960s, faced with a common nuclear threat of China, 
Washington and Moscow united to negotiate the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty to prevent China and other nuclear aspirants from proliferating 
nuclear weapons.  They shepherded their allies to the nonproliferation table and made 
them sign the treaties.  Their efforts retarded nuclear proliferation but failed to prevent 
China, India, and Pakistan, from gaining nuclear weapons.  Following the Cold War their 
cooperative relationship changed as Washington began treating Moscow as an unequal 
partner and their nonproliferation efforts broke down into a cooperative and 
uncooperative mix.  This mix has reduced the effectiveness of their efforts and may 
accelerate proliferation.  The September 11th terrorist attacks put more attention on the 
nuclear proliferation threat to the international community.  If this threat is to be 
minimized, Washington and Moscow need to work together, as they did against China, to 
prevent new nuclear powers from emerging. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In a blinding flash of light and intense searing heat, hundreds of thousands of 
Americans are instantly killed as a nuclear device, stolen from the former Soviet Union, 
vaporizes a U.S. city.  Scenarios like this with such high consequences were dismissed 
prior to September 11 because the probabilities of their occurrences were considered too 
low.1  This all changed following the 9/11 terrorists’ attacks as fears of nuclear terrorism 
jumped in the United States and U.S. leadership focused greater attention on the threat of 
global nuclear proliferation.  The largest potential contributors to nuclear nonproliferation 
are the massive nuclear stockpiles left vulnerable to theft and smuggling following the 
Soviet Union’s collapse.  Nuclear theft from these stockpiles is a reality; two dozen 
incidents have been reported by Russia,2 but fortunately the amounts stolen have not been 
large enough to produce a nuclear weapon, and most of it has been recovered.  
Washington and Moscow mutually fear nuclear proliferation, yet their efforts to prevent 
it have varied since the advent of nuclear weapons.  This thesis assesses why the United 
States and Russia, following the end of the Cold War, sometimes cooperate on nuclear 
nonproliferation and other times do not. 
I conduct a historical survey of U.S.-Soviet nonproliferation policies to identify 
why they have varied their cooperative effort in fighting the spread of nuclear weapons.  I 
categorize the U.S.-Soviet nonproliferation efforts into three eras.  The first era is the 
escalation of the Cold War, 1945 to 1962, when Washington and Moscow acted 
unilaterally and uncooperatively to prevent nuclear proliferation.  The second era is the 
arms control period, 1963 to 1991, during which they cooperated in nuclear 
nonproliferation through arms control and international organizations.  The last era is the 
post-Cold War period, 1991 to the present, and is a mix of cooperative and uncooperative 
efforts.  The following three questions provide the basis for answering the main thesis 
                                                 
1 Matthew Bunn and George Bunn, “Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage,” Conference 
Proceedings, Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna, 
Austria, October 29 – November 2, 2001, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2001. 
2 2U.S. Department of Energy, “MPC&A Strategic Plan,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/mpcaplan.pdf (accessed 26 August 2004). 
2 
question: 1) why did the United States and Soviet Union pursue separate but similar 
nuclear nonproliferation efforts during the first era?  2) Why did the superpowers 
cooperate in nuclear nonproliferation in the second era?  3) Why do the United State and 
Russia currently use a mix of cooperative and non-cooperative efforts in combating 
nuclear proliferation? 
B. BACKGROUND 
Two great powers emerged from World War II - the United States and Soviet 
Union - but U.S. nuclear capability had tipped the balance of power in favor of the United 
States.  U.S. nuclear weapons created a security dilemma for the Soviet Union; while 
they boosted U.S. security, Russia felt it was a direct threat to its security,3 and acted to 
balance U.S. power by developing an indigenous nuclear weapon.  Although the great 
powers presented the Baruch and Gromyko plans at the United Nations (UN) to control 
fissionable material, the anarchic, self-help international system made cooperation 
difficult and bred competition.4  Their mutual distrust of one another prevented them 
from working together in stopping nuclear proliferation and they resorted to unilateral 
efforts during the first era.  Their parallel efforts created a tacit arrangement of preventing 
global nuclear proliferation, and “spontaneous cooperation,” without legally binding 
agreements or formal rules began. 5  The nonproliferation limitations of spontaneous 
cooperation were realized during the 1960s with the Cuban Missile Crisis and first 
Chinese nuclear detonation. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis and first Chinese nuclear test led the superpowers to 
formally unite their efforts.  They did so by changing their nonproliferation arrangement 
from tacit to explicit by mandating strict patterns of action and defining what constituted 
cooperation and defection.6  Although their nonproliferation policies were similar, giving 
nuclear assistance to their allies, U.S. assistance to NATO and Soviet assistance to China, 
put them on a course for a nuclear showdown.  Washington was not overly concerned 
                                                 
3Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 
170. 
4Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World 
Politics (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 15. 
5Ibid., 20. 
6Ibid. 
3 
about their close allies and friends going nuclear, and actually envisioned a strategic 
benefit by “equipping” them with these weapons.7  While Washington did not mind 
helping NATO and Moscow was very eager to help China, they were opposed to their 
rival doing the same thing and wanted to prevent it.  Soviet actions to prevent West 
Germany from gaining nuclear weapons led to the Cuban Missile Crisis which began the 
process of changing the superpowers’ attitude of cooperation.  Crisis management, or the 
attempts to advance and protect interests and security by “coercive threats and 
maneuvers,”8 led to an amicable solution  The superpowers reached an agreement that 
reduced the perceived security threat, and managed to negotiate a minimal arms control 
treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963, but another storm was brewing.  
China’s nuclear program was a great threat to Washington and Moscow, and its 
successful nuclear test in 1964 forced the superpowers to accept the reality that if they 
did not cooperate, other countries would proliferate. 
Washington and Moscow realized that if they did not work together to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons, their security would always be in jeopardy.  They began to 
cooperate through “conflict resolution” by negotiating how they could work together to 
prevent new countries joining the nuclear club.9  These negotiations led to a long-term 
security regime, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.  Their efforts 
resulted in the most instrumental regime in preventing widespread proliferation.  It has 
been successful because Washington and Moscow convinced almost all their allies and 
friends not to pursue nuclear weapons and accede to the treaty.  The superpowers entered 
a period of arms control agreements that were designed to retard proliferation and 
eventually lead to nuclear disarmament.  The united efforts of the superpowers were 
challenged and have diminished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The post-Cold War era has witnessed a mix of cooperative and uncooperative 
efforts in nonproliferation.  The United States and Russia claim they are committed to 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, yet their actions are sometimes questionable.  
                                                 
7Jim Walsh, Russian and American Nonproliferation Policy: Success, Failure, and the Role of 
Cooperation (MTA Occasional Paper 2004-01, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 
2004), 29. 
8Ibid., 24. 
9Ibid., 25. 
4 
While they were united in preventing proliferation in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and 
Russia through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR), Russia withheld 
support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for over a year.  Russia has, 
according to the United States, also encouraged proliferation by assisting India’s missile 
program and providing nuclear assistance to Iran.10  The United States unilaterally 
attacked Iraq for supposedly possessing weapons of mass destruction despite Russian and 
international protests.  The mix of cooperative and uncooperative efforts send mixed 
signals to the global community that weaken current nonproliferation regimes and efforts 
and erode years of cooperation. 
C. SEVERITY OF PROBLEM 
The potential exists for nuclear proliferation to pick up its pace if Washington and 
Moscow do not view the severity of the threat in the same light.  They are divided on the 
nuclear threat Iran poses to the international community and unless they unite their 
efforts, Iran will be a nuclear power in a short period of time.  Rouge states and non-state 
actors have also shown an interest in getting a nuclear device.  North Korea has been very 
persistent in its attempts to become a nuclear power, and Osama bin Laden has indicated 
it is his “religious duty” to acquire nuclear weapons.11  In order to slow down Iran’s 
nuclear aspirations and prevent, as best they can, nuclear proliferation by rouge and non-
state actors, the United States and Russia must define the greatest threats and work 
together to eliminate them.  The events of September 11, 2001 only elevate concerns that 
the next major terrorist attack might involve a nuclear or radiological weapon.12 
Another factor that increases the threat of proliferation comes from the former 
Soviet Union.  It had the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and its disintegration left nuclear 
weapon stockpiles and material in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia vulnerable 
to theft.13  How probable is it that nuclear material could be stolen from the Soviet 
                                                 
10Michael Eisenstadt, “Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Policy Challenges for the 
United States,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_03/eisenstadt.asp 
(accessed 28 July 2004). 
11Charles B. Curtis, “Issues Facing the Global Nonproliferation Regime,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
http://www.nti.org/c_press/c1_speeches.html (accessed August 16, 2004). 
12Tom Collina and Jon Wolfsthal, “Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia,” Arms Control 
Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/colwolfapril02.asp (accessed March 8, 2004). 
13Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Information,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/index.html (accessed March 1, 2004). 
5 
Union, and then used against the United States?  Senator Sam Nunn, CTR co-founder and 
advocate, believes it is highly likely.  He said theft of nuclear material or weapons from 
the former Soviet Union posed “The most serious national security threat to the United 
States and it allies.”14  Senator Richard Lugar, CTR co-founder and advocate, added that 
if the United States hopes to have any chance of stopping a nuclear detonation on its 
territory it must start preventive measure at the source, which are, “the weapons and 
material depots and research institutes in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.”15  
Although Washington and Moscow initiated the CTR program to secure and eliminate 
nuclear weapons and material, a credible threat still exists since the physical security at 
many nuclear facilities is still not as strong as it needs to be.16 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Washington attempted to 
further thwart this potential threat by increasing domestic security and reaffirming its 
commitment to the CTR program with Russia.  It has also updated its National Security 
Strategy to reflect a new doctrine which states the United States reserves the right to act 
preemptively.17  Additionally in 2003, President Bush initiated the PSI calling for the 
interdiction of suspected shipments of weapons of mass destruction; fifteen countries are 
participants and sixty more endorse its principles.18  After withholding PSI support for 
over a year, Russia announced in June 2004 it was joining this international effort to 
combat proliferation.19 
 
 
 
                                                 
14Department of Energy, “MPC&A Program Strategic Plan,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/mpcaplan.pdf (accessed August 18, 2004). 
15Ibid. 
16Curtis, “Issues Facing the Global Nonproliferation Regime,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
http://www.nti.org/c_press/c1_speeches.html. 
17President George W. Bush, “National Security Strategy,” The White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html (accessed 12 August 2004). 
18Wade Boese, “Proliferation Security Initiative Advances – but Russia and China Keep Their 
Distance,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_03/PSI.asp (accessed 8 March 
2004). 
19Reuters, “Russia joins Bush's drive against WMDs,” Gazeta, http://www.gazeta.ru/cgi-
bin/newsarc.cgi (accessed July 1, 2004). 
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Nonproliferation 
Efforts 
Outcome 
Cases involving no Cooperation Cases involving 
Cooperation 
Failure China France 
Great Britain 
India 
Israel 
Pakistan 
0 
 
Success Argentina Australia 
Belarus 
Brazil 
Canada 
Cuba 
Egypt 
Germany 
Greece 
Indonesia 
Italy 
 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Romania 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
Yugoslavia 
Other NPT 
signatories 
Belarus 
Cuba 
Germany 
Kazakhstan 
South Africa 
Ukraine 
Other NPT signatories 
Table 1. Cooperative Nonproliferation Outcomes (After Walsh, 22)20 
 
D. ARGUMENT 
This thesis argues that cooperation is the most successful deterrent in preventing 
proliferation.  While united efforts will not prevent every state from gaining nuclear 
weapons, the success rate is higher than unilateral actions alone, as shown in table 1.  The 
United States can ill afford to fight every nuclear proliferation threat without Russian 
help, which is still a global power in spite of its problems.  U.S. and Russian unilateral 
actions did not stop nuclear proliferation in the past, and they will fail today.  Their 
                                                 
20 Walsh defines cooperative efforts as being between the United States and Soviet Union.  He 
identifies Britain, France, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan as nonproliferation failures, and Cuba, West 
Germany, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as successes.  He also identified a mixed outcome, meaning it 
represented both success and failure which I decided not to include.  I moved South Africa from mixed to 
success since I believe it should be considered a success, as described later.  I also added NPT signatories 
since U.S.-Soviet efforts brought their allies and friends, other than the ones already listed, to the NPT table 
and made them become NPT members, giving up future desires of nuclear proliferation, unless they 
withdrew. 
7 
interests are different and their leaders will not agree on every proliferation threat, but the 
threats they do agree on need unified efforts or nuclear nonproliferation will become a 
thing of the past. 
E. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II is a historical perspective of U.S. and Soviet nuclear nonproliferation 
policies during the escalation of the Cold War.  This chapter analyzes why Washington 
and Moscow chose similar but uncooperative efforts in preventing global nuclear 
proliferation and concludes by presenting that distrust between the superpowers was the 
main reason they refused to cooperate. 
Chapter III covers the era of arms control agreements between the superpowers.  
This chapter investigates the reasons why the United States and Soviet Union decided to 
act cooperatively in preventing the global spread of nuclear weapons.  A short history of 
the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises is presented followed by a discussion of two 
nonproliferation regimes, the LTBT and NPT, entered into by Washington and Moscow.  
The conclusion is that the superpowers learned to cooperate in nonproliferation by setting 
aside their distrust for one another, at least in one area of common concern.  China’s 
successful ascension to nuclear status was the catalyst for bringing the superpowers 
together. 
Chapter IV focuses on the post-Cold War era.  This chapter probes why the 
United States and Russia are using a mix of cooperative and uncooperative efforts to 
counter proliferation.  Three cases representing a different mix of cooperative efforts of 
Washington and Moscow are presented.  The first case presents U.S. and Russian 
cooperative efforts and involves their efforts to secure and dismantle nuclear stockpiles 
and weapons in the former Soviet Union.  The second case presents a mix of cooperative 
efforts involving the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Missile Technology Control 
Regime.  The last cases present no cooperation with Russia providing nuclear assistance 
to Iran and the U.S war in Iraq.  The chapter concludes that U.S.-Russian cooperative 
efforts  have  varied  for  the following reasons: 1) the global balance of power shifted in  
8 
favor of the United States, 2) respect for each other decreased and distrust increased, and 
3) Russia’s internal problems forced it to focus on stabilizing itself rather than on 
nonproliferation. 
Chapter V summarizes the findings from the previous chapters.  Initial 
nonproliferation efforts between Washington and Moscow were disjointed and unilateral 
because of growing distrust of the others’ actions.  The superpowers came together to 
prevent China, a common nuclear proliferation threat, and other states from joining the 
nuclear club.  Their efforts were largely successful albeit a few countries still managed to 
go nuclear.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War has challenged 
U.S. and Russian resolve to cooperate in nuclear matters, and their efforts have devolved 
to a mix of cooperative and uncooperative efforts.  The implications of being less unified 
are twofold.  First, the effectiveness of nonproliferation barriers previously built by the 
United States and Russia are reduced.  Second, nuclear proliferation may accelerate as 
rouge and non-state actors take advantage of dwindling U.S.-Russian cooperation.  Iran, 
North Korea, rouge states, and non-state actors have stepped up their efforts become 
nuclear weapon powers in the post-Cold War environment.  If Washington and Moscow 
want to decelerate nuclear proliferation they will need to make a more concerted effort to 
assist and work with one another, and make combating nuclear proliferation a higher 
priority than their distrust of one another.  Cooperation will not be possible in every case, 
but efforts to work together should be the norm, not the exception. 
 
9 
II. ESCALATION OF THE COLD WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Standing on the brink of annihilation, the superpower leaders played a dangerous 
game of nuclear chicken during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Nearly twenty years after end 
of World War II, the United States and Soviet Union stood toe-to-toe in the world’s 
tensest nuclear confrontation.  The U.S. nuclear monopoly was a major reason for the 
collapse of the U.S.-Soviet alliance following World War II.  The Soviet Union urgently 
worked to develop nuclear weapons to balance the United States, and became the world’s 
first nuclear proliferator.21  Its decision to pursue nuclear weapons, amid U.S. attempts to 
prevent it, brought about a furious arms race.  This chapter explores why the United 
States and Soviet Union endured such a long period of unilateral actions before they 
chose to cooperate in nuclear nonproliferation. 
I present a historical survey of U.S. and Soviet nuclear nonproliferation policies to 
explore why they chose not to cooperate.  The next section explores the superpowers’ 
history of nuclear nonproliferation policies to answer the question.  As the superpowers’ 
fear of proliferation grew, they adopted similar unilateral policies to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons.22  The conclusion presents the finding that distrust between the 
superpowers prevented cooperation from developing. 
B. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EVOLUTION 
U.S. and Soviet tensions escalated between 1945 and 1962.  Two key factors were 
instrumental: 1) the U.S. nuclear monopoly and 2) the German nuclear question.  The 
balance of power favored the United States because of its nuclear monopoly, and the 
Soviet Union desperately struggled to restore the balance through nuclear development.23  
Moscow poured every ounce of effort into this project and went nuclear much earlier than 
U.S. intelligence expected.  The Soviet nuclear bomb meant the U.S. monopoly would 
                                                 
21Joseph S. Nye Jr., “U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in a Nonproliferation Regime.” In U.S.-Soviet Security 
Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, ed. Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander 
Dalling (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 338. 
22 Ibid., 337. 
23 David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994), 132. 
10 
soon vanish, and the U.S. redoubled its efforts to maintain its monopoly by developing 
the superbomb.  The U.S. superbomb detonation in 1952 was matched by the Soviet 
Union less than a year later.  The arms race intensified as the superpowers attempted to 
gain nuclear superiority through massive nuclear stockpiles and more powerful and 
destructive nuclear weapons, but this was only one factor for the Cold War escalations. 
The allies originally planned to keep Germany from rising again as a military 
power, but as time passed, this stance changed.  The Western powers considered 
rearming Western Germany to help check the growing Soviet threat and U.S. leadership 
even hinted at providing it nuclear weapons.24  Moscow was very leery of western plans 
and the German nuclear question was the greatest contributor to escalating Cold War 
tensions in Europe.25  
The implications of being nuclear powers were unclear to the superpowers’, 26  
and their initial nuclear policy of secrecy and unilateral control reflected this, but as they 
dealt with the ramifications of having nuclear weapons, their nonproliferation policies 
evolved and matured.  Although the United States and Soviet Union did not cooperate to 
prevent proliferation, their policies were nearly identical.  They initially used secrecy and 
unilateral restriction to prevent proliferation, but as new countries joined the nuclear club, 
they switched to nuclear sharing.  This switch in policy did not prevent proliferation, and 
their fear of the additional nuclear powers drove them to cooperate in negotiating a 
nuclear nonproliferation treaty. 
1. Secrecy and Unilateral Restriction 
The prospect of Germany being the first to develop the nuclear bomb forced the 
United States into action.  Roosevelt ordered an all-out effort to develop the atomic 
weapon in November 1941 in cooperation with Britain, whose nuclear science was 
superior to U.S. technology.27  In June 1942 the top-secret Manhattan Project began.28  
                                                 
24Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 209-210. 
25 Ibid.  This statement reflects the overall conclusion of A Constructed Peace by Marc Trachtenberg. 
26Walsh, 2. 
27Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), 164. 
11 
Progress was impressive as fear of a German nuclear monopoly brought a sense of 
urgency to the project.29  Everything about the program was kept secret for fear that any 
leak in U.S. nuclear efforts would cause the Germans to accelerate their work.  Many 
nuclear scientists, including Roosevelt’s science advisors, were against secrecy because 
they were convinced it would promote nuclear proliferation. 30  They believed Stalin 
might be convinced of the necessity of international atomic energy control and 
international cooperation if secrecy was abolished.31  The U.S. atomic monopoly would 
not last long, they predicted, and the risks of international control would be less than a 
nuclear arms race.32  Roosevelt initially agreed, but Churchill convinced him to maintain 
absolute secrecy because of the distrust for Stalin.  The alliance with the Soviet Union 
was built to fight a common enemy, Germany, and not on trust. 
The Soviet Union was involved in nuclear research prior to the start of World War 
II, but it all but stopped as Soviet researchers joined the war effort.33  In 1942 Soviet 
physicist Gheorgy Flerov sounded the alarm on U.S. nuclear development.  He noticed 
that all references to U.S. atomic work or of leading American nuclear physicists in an 
American physics journal ceased.  He realized this meant the United States had gone top 
secret with its nuclear research.34  It took nearly a year after Flerov elevated this issue for 
Stalin to push nuclear research into high gear.  These atomic efforts were not critical to 
the war efforts against Germany; rather they were a “small hedge against future 
uncertainties” that might arise from U.S. nuclear efforts.35  After the atomic detonations 
over Japan, the United States and Soviet Union presented at the UN differing plans for 
international atomic control to prevent nuclear proliferation. 
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The atomic devastation in Japan convinced Truman and other U.S. leadership to 
propose international nuclear control, as long as it met U.S. requirements.  In 
Congressional testimony in October 1945, Truman stated the United States could support 
international control as long as it prevented proliferation, replaced nuclear rivalry with 
cooperation, and followed U.S. established criteria.36  The Acheson-Lilienthal committee 
was charged with developing an international atomic control plan, and in early 1946 
released its report calling for an international Atomic Development Authority (ADA).  
The report stated the ADA was needed because no inspection system could prevent the 
diversion of nuclear material to war purposes because there were too many opportunities 
to cheat.37  To prevent the diversion of such material the ADA would participate in many 
atomic energy production activities, including all aspects that are considered dangerous.38 
Bernard Baruch, U.S. representative to the UN, made this report the building 
block for his international control presentation at the UN in June 1946.  The Plan’s intent 
was twofold: 1) prevent other nations from pursuing nuclear weapons, and 2) establish 
international control for atomic energy.  Truman told Baruch, “We should not under any 
circumstances throw away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can’t arm 
against us.”39  The United States would submit to international control and give up its 
nuclear weapons only after all other nations agreed not to develop them.  Baruch changed 
the spirit of the Acheson-Lilienthal report from “conciliation to belligerence,”40 calling 
for the “immediate, swift and sure” punishment of states attempting to develop nuclear 
weapons.41  Acheson said Moscow could interpret this provision as an attempt by the 
United States to create a UN alliance to enforce its efforts to stop Soviet nuclear 
developments.”42  Baruch believed the Security Council members’ veto power, in atomic 
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energy cases, could be used as a delay tactic to give offending nations more time to 
develop nuclear capabilities, and proposed its removal.  The Soviet Union rejected the 
Baruch Plan and countered with the Gromyko Plan. 
The Soviet Union was feverishly developing its nuclear weapon and not willing to 
submit to U.S. nuclear superiority.  The Soviet UN Security Council representative, 
Andrei Gromyko, presented the Soviet plan for international control.  It rejected the 
Baruch Plan’s provision allowing the United States to keep its nuclear arsenal because 
this would freeze its nuclear superiority without the Soviets ever achieving nuclear 
status.43  It demanded the United States give up its nuclear weapons and cease all fissile 
production before other nations submitted to international control.44  The Soviet Union 
realized this demand would force the United States to reject the Gromyko Plan since it 
would not give up its monopoly.45  Rather than form a powerful international ADA, 
which Moscow felt would be dominated by Americans and bring all nuclear material 
under U.S. control46 it proposed individual states enforce nonproliferation within their 
own borders.47  The Soviet Union objected to removing the Security Council members’ 
veto power since it would erode the fundamental principles of the UN and give the 
United States too much power in controlling other states.48   
The superpowers were not willing to compromise their positions and negotiation 
stalled.  The first attempts at international control of atomic energy failed.  After two 
fruitless years, the United States recommended ending negotiations because it believed 
the Soviet Union was trying to buy more time for its nuclear program.49 
In September 1945, Congress introduced legislation to restrict U.S. nuclear 
technology and information sharing.  Senator Brian McMahon’s proposal, which became 
the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1946, relied upon secrecy and unilateral restriction 
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to prevent nuclear proliferation.  The UN impasse on international atomic control made 
AEA passage a critical issue for Congress, and in July 1946, it passed both Houses and 
became law.  The AEA made it virtually impossible for the United States to share any 
nuclear information with anyone, including Great Britain.50  The AEA established the 
Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy to insure nuclear information was kept 
secret.  It had tremendous power and could veto all international atomic energy 
agreements.51  This legislation failed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.  On August 
29, 1949, the Soviet Union successfully detonated its first atomic bomb and a foreboding 
memo to President Truman predicting an arms race towards mutual destruction began to 
be fulfilled.52  Secrecy failed to prevent nuclear proliferation and a new policy of sharing 
began to take shape. 
2. Sharing Nuclear Secrets 
The Soviet atomic success dealt several blows to the United States.  First, 
Washington realized its nuclear monopoly and ability to pressure the Moscow would 
soon end.  Second, no matter how tight-lipped it was, nuclear capability was within reach 
of other countries.  Third, it realized it needed to cooperate with its allies to prevent 
proliferation and check Soviet nuclear progress.  These realizations made Eisenhower 
shift U.S. policy from secrecy to sharing, but it took Congress five years to pass the 
necessary legislation to allow his policies. 
During these five years several key events further convinced the United States to 
cooperate.  The Soviet Union proved its technical capabilities were at parity with the 
United States by testing a superbomb shortly after the United States.53  Churchill 
threatened to disclose the World War II U.S.-British atomic cooperation and revoke U.S. 
basing rights on British bases unless the United States renewed nuclear cooperation with 
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it.54  Newly elected President Eisenhower expressed his opinion that Britain had been 
treated poorly in “post-war nuclear matters” and lobbied for increased cooperation.55   
Eisenhower believed atomic power could be used politically and militarily to 
improve U.S. security and relations with allies, and advocated a two-pronged nuclear 
sharing approach.56  The first prong was the Atoms for Peace program which he 
presented before the UN in December 1953.  It promised nuclear assistance for peaceful 
purposes after countries had renounced their intentions of seeking nuclear weapons.  The 
second prong involved the military, and allowed sharing the characteristic of U.S. nuclear 
weapons deployed in Europe.  Eisenhower believed providing NATO allies with this 
information would preempt their incentives to develop their own independent national 
nuclear force.57  Congress passed a 1954 revision to the Atomic Energy Act to 
accommodate Eisenhower’s new two-pronged policy. 
The Atoms for Peace program’s main accomplishment was the founding of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).58  Eisenhower envisioned the IAEA as a 
bank-like organization that would impound, store, and protect contributed fissionable and 
other materials, from the United States and Soviet Union, and disperse them to nations 
for peaceful atomic purposes.59  Although both countries’ contributions would be small 
in comparison to their stockpiles, their cooperative efforts might “finesse the intractable 
problems of inspection, enforcement, and international control that had doomed the 
Baruch Plan and other comprehensive approaches.”60  The United States believed this 
would slow or stop nuclear proliferation by making acquisition of nuclear materials much 
more difficult and shift countries away from proliferation towards peaceful nuclear uses.  
It was also hoped that Atoms for Peace would also lead to the eventual disarmament of 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 72. 
55 Ibid., 107-109. 
56Walsh, 3. 
57 Ibid., 28. 
58Nye Jr., 336. 
59Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace: Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the 
United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,” 
IAEA.org, http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html (accessed 15 August 2004). 
60 Clausen, 30. 
16 
the superpowers. 61  While the peaceful use of nuclear energy was promoted and did have 
some success, it did not lead to disarmament and actually assisted India in gaining 
nuclear capability.62 
Negotiations changed IAEA’s fundamental purpose and provided the first 
glimmer of hope that Washington and Moscow could cooperate in nuclear matters.  
Soviet leadership was concerned the Atoms for Peace program would promote 
proliferation by spreading fissile material around the globe, and put their participation in 
the fissile bank in doubt.63  Since the Soviet Union’s participation was questionable, U.S. 
leaders realized a fissile bank would not work and changed IAEA’s purpose to be a 
“clearing house” to buy and resell nuclear power plants and fuel.64  The Soviet Union 
rejoined negotiations and helped stand up the IAEA in 1957. 
Eisenhower determined it was time for Europe to become “a third great power 
bloc” and take responsibility for its defense against the Soviet Union. 65  The United 
States had drawn down its European troop presence after World War II and depended on 
its nuclear monopoly to deter the Soviet Union.  Following the first Soviet atomic test, 
U.S. leadership realized retaking Europe would be impossible against a nuclear armed 
Soviet Union and built-up military forces in Europe to prevent it from being overrun.66  
This buildup was a temporary fix until Western Europe could defend itself, which it 
could do sooner if two things occurred: 1) U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed to 
Europe, and 2) West Germany was permitted to remilitarize to contribute forces to 
Europe’s defense.  Two obstacles stood in the way of these solutions: the AEA of 1946 
prevented U.S. nuclear assistance, and the Soviet Union threatened preemptive strikes if 
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West Germany was allowed to rearm.67  Eisenhower developed a work around to the 
AEA problem by not ”overtly” giving; U.S. nuclear weapons to NATO allies but made 
U.S. custody so “weak and ineffectual” that effective control was essentially in European 
hands.68  At the end of his presidency, non-U.S. NATO forces had nearly five hundred 
U.S. nuclear weapons in their possession,69 but he had not resolved the Soviet concern of 
West Germany. 
Soviet participation in Atoms for Peace was forced upon them when the United 
States announced the program.  Soviet leadership was initially against the plan because of 
its proliferation risk.  Foreign Minister Molotov told Secretary of State Dulles Atoms for 
Peace would only add to the world’s supply of “weapon-usable fissile material,” a point 
the United States had not considered.70  Even with the proliferation problems, it was too 
“politically risky” to reject and in July 1954 it agreed to participate.71  The Soviet Union 
went beyond the scope of the U.S. program by offering its assistance to all countries 
within and without the Soviet bloc without requiring “military or political restrictions.”72  
The Soviet Atoms for Peace participation ended abruptly in 1958 due to an increasingly 
aggressive China. 
Soviet participation in Atoms for Peace enabled it to share nuclear secrets with its 
ally, China, without U.S. condemnation.  The Soviet Union and China established the 
Sino-Soviet science and technology commission in 1954.73  In 1957 their cooperation had 
grown close enough that a defense agreement was signed giving the Chinese Soviet 
technical data for building an atomic bomb, and a prototype to study.74  Khrushchev 
recalled, “We’d given the Chinese almost everything they asked for.  We kept no secrets 
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from them.”75  Their relationship quickly deteriorated when China acted too aggressively 
towards the United States, perhaps encouraged by Khrushchev’s “boasts of Soviet 
nuclear-missile superiority over the West.”76  The split in the Sino-Soviet pact occurred 
in 1958 during the Taiwan Strait crisis at which point the Soviet Union realized the folly 
in sharing atomic secrets.  If it continued sharing nuclear technology the time might come 
when one of its nuclear assisted allies might drag it into a nuclear war with the United 
States.77  The risk was too much and the Soviet Union stopped Atoms for Peace 
participation, backed out of the Sino-Soviet pact, and reneged on sending the prototype 
atomic weapon to China. 
Kennedy changed the NATO sharing policy when he became President.  Nuclear 
proliferation, especially China, was now a main concern, and nuclear sharing fell out of 
vogue.78  Control of nuclear weapons was taken back but the European nuclear question 
was not solved.  Europe was not prepared to defend itself now, nor in the near future, and 
needed U.S. assistance.  The United States might be able to help Britain and France with 
nuclear weapons, but Kennedy knew giving nuclear help to West Germany was too risky.  
To prevent further problems with the Soviet Union, he decided West Germany would not 
go nuclear, and U.S. troops would defend it indefinitely.  Kennedy presented this idea to 
Khrushchev in June 1961, but it was rejected.79  A year later the unsolved German 
nuclear question bore fruit: the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The overarching reason the superpowers chose not to cooperate in preventing 
nuclear proliferation was distrust.  Capitalism and communism are on differing sides of 
the political spectrum and the resulting mistrust is evident in their relationship.  Their 
World War II alliance was not built on trust but rather on fighting a common enemy.  
Mistrust prevented them from informing or involving the other in their respective nuclear 
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research.  The U.S. nuclear monopoly shifted the balance of power in its favor and 
increased the Soviet distrust for the United States and led to the alliance collapse.  Stalin 
realized that achieving the nuclear bomb would not only restore the balance of power, it 
would give him additional strategic power, and eliminate the U.S. nuclear monopoly.  In 
order to get its prestige back, the Soviet Union needed to counter the U.S. strength with a 
nuclear bomb; therefore it could not agree to proliferation cooperation with the United 
States until it had the same power 
The U.S. and Soviet international atomic control plans were conceived on distrust 
for the other.  The U.S. plan would have locked in its nuclear monopoly over the Soviet 
Union.  If Stalin accepted it, the Soviet Union would always be in a position of weakness 
in any future dealings with the United States.  The Soviet counter-proposal, called for the 
United States to give up its nuclear monopoly before establishing international atomic 
control, which the United States refused to do. 
Additionally, the United States and Soviet Union had a genuine fear of other 
nuclear powers, especially if it was its rival’s ally.  While both were against the other 
helping its allies obtain nuclear capability they saw nothing wrong with helping their 
respective allies.  This oxymoronic belief led to more problems in cooperation than any 
other nonproliferation policy adopted because it bred mistrust of the other’s actions.  For 
example, the United States discussed different options for Europe to counter the Soviet 
threat including giving France, Britain, and West Germany nuclear weapons.  The option 
of helping West Germany infuriated the Soviet Union because it had been surprise 
attacked twice by Germany, and was not willing to allow it a third chance.  The United 
States feared the spread of communism and looked down upon the eagerness of the 
Soviet Union to help China with nuclear technology.  Their respective fears of additional 
nuclear powers and distrust of the others’ motivation prevented the United States and 
Soviet Union from cooperating. 
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III. LEARNING TO COOPERATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On July 30, 1977, a Soviet satellite discovered South Africa’s secret nuclear test 
site in the Kalahari Desert, and on August 6, 1977, four more satellite passes confirmed 
this discovery.80  The Soviet Union alerted the United States about the nuclear testing 
facility and a U.S. satellite verified the findings.  Cooperative efforts and pressure from 
the United States and Soviet Union played a major part in convincing South Africa not to 
conduct nuclear tests.  South Africa yielded to international pressure and sealed off the 
nuclear test facilities’ underground shafts.  The united efforts of the superpowers stand in 
stark contrast to their unilateral nonproliferation attempts during the first two decades of 
the Cold War. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis was a pivotal event in starting U.S.-Soviet cooperative 
nonproliferation efforts.  The Crisis made the superpowers realize understanding and 
cooperation were necessary ingredients in preventing proliferation.  Several key events in 
1963 eased tensions further: the LTBT was signed, the German nuclear question was 
answered, and the United States lost its nuclear superiority.  This chapter examines why 
the United States and Soviet Union cooperated in nuclear proliferation between 1963 and 
1991. 
In this chapter I present the key events that led to U.S. and Soviet cooperation.  
The background section discusses these events and their effect on the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship.  It is divided into two main subsections: the first is a short history of the 
German nuclear question and the second discusses the Limited Test Ban and Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaties.  The chapter concludes the superpowers set their mistrust of 
one another aside and focused their efforts on combating the spread of nuclear weapons 
through international nonproliferation regimes. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
The crucial dividing line in U.S.-Soviet cooperation occurred with several 
significant events during the first half of the 1960s.  Soviet angst about a nuclear West 
Germany and China erupted, the U.S. nuclear superiority waned, China went nuclear, and 
arms control negotiations began in earnest.  The events, although initially painful, 
produced positive consequences in U.S.-Soviet relations and were causal factors in 
creating cooperation. 
Moscow felt the greatest nuclear threat came from two countries, West Germany 
and China. 81  The U.S. plan to remilitarize Germany through a multilateral nuclear force 
(MLF) was the proliferation-“straw that broke the camel’s back.”  Soviet opposition to 
this plan was the causal factor to the Berlin Crisis and later the Cuban Missile Crisis.82  
Matters were only made worse as Sino-Soviet relations fell apart.  Moscow had provided 
inordinate nuclear help to China during Atom for Peace, and as their relationship 
deteriorated, the threat of a large hostile nuclear power on its borders scared Moscow.  
Pushed to the brink of nuclear war over the German nuclear question and a nuclear 
neighbor were motivating factors for Moscow to work with Washington in 
nonproliferation. 
The end of U.S. nuclear superiority loomed ominously on the horizon after the 
Soviet Union successfully tested its first nuclear weapon.  Washington dreaded the day 
when the Soviet Union would achieve parity; it feared its nuclear deterrent would no 
longer prevent Soviet aggression.  Nuclear parity was reached in 1963, but increasing 
Soviet aggressions failed to materialize, as a matter-of-fact, relations between the 
superpowers improved.83  The relaxation of tensions was the genesis of the arms control 
era.  Although problems still persisted, distrust, competition, and unilateral policies were 
minimized and cooperation maximized. 
The superpowers’ proliferation concern grew as additional countries joined the 
nuclear club: Britain (1952), France (1960), and China (1964).  China’s ascension to 
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nuclear status was the most threatening to the superpowers and the key event unifying 
their fight against proliferation.  China’s nuclear ambitions began in response to U.S. 
nuclear threats during the Korean War,84 and their efforts were greatly assisted by the 
Soviet Union.  It is estimated the Soviet Union accelerated China’s nuclear program 
fifteen years ahead of a normal schedule.85  Its nuclear progress led Kennedy to label it a 
serious security threat to the United States,86 and his fears were confirmed when the 
Pentagon placed China at the top of a list of more than ten countries with the potential of 
going nuclear within the decade.87  Soviet leadership shared the same sentiment of China 
as the United States, and wanted to prevent it from achieving nuclear status.  Their initial 
efforts, the LTBT, fell far short and the Chinese achieved their objective.  The first 
successful Chinese nuclear test on October 16, 1964, convinced U.S. and Soviet leaders 
that they could no longer delay cooperative efforts in preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons, and they began nonproliferation treaty negotiations in haste. 
U.S. and Soviet politicians did not seriously pursue arms control before the Cuban 
Missile Crisis for two reasons.  First, the U.S. and Soviet leaders rarely saw the same 
proposal being in their nations’ interest at the same time.88  Second, arms control 
negotiations were not always used to achieve an agreement; rather they were instruments 
for maintaining military contact, presenting a peaceful image to the world, or justifying 
military action because of an uncooperative adversary.89  U.S. politicians crafted arms 
control policies based on U.S. nuclear superiority knowing Moscow would not accept 
them.  They proposed these fruitless arms control platforms because public opinion 
expected them to make an effort.90  Additionally, U.S. leaders did not want America to 
look like a militaristic state,91 so arms control agreements were public relation tools used 
                                                 
84Nuclear Threat Initiative, “China's Nuclear Weapon Development, Modernization and Testing,” 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/db/china/wnwmdat.htm (accessed 26 August 2004). 
85Roland Timerbaev, Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), 134. 
86William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “A Chinese Puzzle,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1997/ja97/ja97richelson.html (accessed 26 August 2004). 
87 Bunn, 67-68. 
88Ibid., 2. 
89Ibid. 
90Trachtenberg, 382. 
91Ibid. 
24 
to gain domestic approval and appease the international community.  Soviet intentions 
were no better as nuclear disarmament was viewed as impractical and any discussion on 
this subject was mainly for propaganda purposes.92 
Standing on the brink of nuclear war and China’s nuclear success brought U.S. 
and Soviet leaders to their senses.  They moved beyond public relation games and began 
serious negotiations.  After two uncooperative decades, the superpowers were catalyzed 
by mutual dependence to pursue nonproliferation regimes.  They negotiated and 
established the following four arms control treaties: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, 
and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 
The events of 1963 made the U.S. and Soviet leadership believe two things.93  
First, although their countries were superpowers, they were not invulnerable from war 
and were dependent on each other’s good behavior to improve their countries’ security.  
Second, although unilateral policies are important for security, they are not strong enough 
to prevent, and may actually promote, competition and instability.  The superpowers 
learned security may be improved by exploring bilateral or multilateral agreements.  
These beliefs created a “mutual dependence” to improve one another’s security and a 
realization that cooperation must supplement a superpower’s own efforts. 
1. Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises 
The Berlin Crisis began in 1958 when Khrushchev announced the Soviet Union 
and East Germany were going to sign a peace treaty, and with it, western rights in West 
Berlin would end.94  Soviet actions were driven by the perceived nuclear proliferation 
threat of West Germany.  Their response sent a powerful message to the Western powers 
that it would not stand idly by and let West Germany become a nuclear power with 
western help.  Eisenhower did not relent to Soviet demands and refused to end the option 
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of sharing nuclear weapons with West Germany.95  Its strength was needed to defend 
Europe when U.S. troops withdrew.  The crisis deepened and remained unresolved until 
after Kennedy became president. 
Khrushchev pressed Kennedy on the German nuclear question, and once again 
promised to cut-off western rights to West Berlin.96  Kennedy offered the following 
provisions to Khrushchev in June 1961: the status quo in Europe would remain; the 
United States and Soviet Union would maintain their spheres of influence, and West 
Germany would not be allowed to threaten the Soviet Union.97  The plan was rejected 
and shortly thereafter the Soviet Union cut off access between East and West Berlin and 
the Berlin Wall was erected.  No substantial progress was made on the German question 
in 1961 or much of 1962, and frustrations mounted.  In October 1962, the Soviet Union 
kicked the German nuclear question up a notch and sent nuclear missiles to Cuba. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis was the culminating event of the German nuclear 
question as Khrushchev moved from tough rhetoric to hostile action in October 1962, by 
deploying nuclear missiles to Cuba.  The United States still had a nuclear advantage and 
used it to challenge the Soviet’s deployments.  Tensions ran high as the superpowers 
inched closer to nuclear war.  Negotiations ended the Crisis and the Soviet Union met 
U.S. demands by redeploying its missiles.  The superpowers realized the next crisis could 
involve many more nuclear nations with less restraint and convinced them to work 
together, however the German nuclear question remained unsolved. 
U.S. leadership knew the Soviet Union would not cooperate until their number 
one concern, West Germany, was resolved.  Kennedy decided to answer the question by 
removing the nuclear option for West Germany, but why limit nuclear nonproliferation to 
just one country?  Rather than single-out West Germany, Kennedy opted to pursue a 
broad arms control agreement that would link to the German question.98  Pursuing this 
route indirectly resolved the German nuclear question, brought about the LTBT, and 
started the arms control era to control nuclear proliferation. 
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2. Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on the LTBT and NPT.  The 
superpowers’ interest in preventing proliferation moved to center stage after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.  Washington and Moscow wanted a comprehensive test ban treaty because 
it would provide a greater deterrence to nuclear development, 99 but they were only able 
to negotiate a limited treaty.  The LTBT was not negotiated to be, nor is it an important 
nonproliferation treaty; it actually did little to prevent proliferation.  The LTBT is 
significant because it was the first cooperative treaty Washington and Moscow 
negotiated, and a precursor to NPT negotiations.  The key to negotiating the NPT was the 
successful Chinese nuclear test.  It convinced the superpowers to plug the 
nonproliferation holes of the LTBT in order to prevent other states from going nuclear. 
a. Limited Test Ban Treaty 
Indian Prime Minister Jawarhal Nehru was the first world leader to call for 
an end to nuclear testing.100  The horrifying consequences of nuclear fallout were 
manifesting themselves and his call represented the voice of the world.  Test ban 
negotiations began in 1955 when Soviet leadership introduced a plan calling for the 
elimination of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban.101  U.S. 
leadership insisted cooperative on-site monitoring was necessary to verify the 
comprehensive test, ban but Soviet leadership refused.  It felt on-site monitoring was too 
intrusive and violated its sovereignty while U.S. opinion was it would be the only way to 
verify the ban and distinguish between earthquakes and low yield explosions.102  
Eventually the Soviet Union compromised and agreed to permit up to three on-site 
inspections per year.103  Further progress came to a halt in 1960, when an American U-2 
was shot down over the Soviet Union. 
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Kennedy wanted a comprehensive test ban treaty negotiated during his 
first year in office because he believed nuclear proliferation was a grave security problem 
to the United States and it would be an important “first step in disarmament and other 
pacts,” with the Soviet Union.104  Additionally, nuclear developments in China disturbed 
him.  If it went nuclear, U.S. and Soviet security would be threatened, and Kennedy 
believed a comprehensive test ban might be the only way to slow the Chinese down.105  
Preventing nuclear proliferation was not the only source of pressure in negotiating a test 
ban treaty. 
Domestic and international pressure against the United States to stop 
nuclear tests increased as nuclear fallout dangers became apparent.  Pressure increased 
after a 1954 U.S. hydrogen bomb test in the Pacific Ocean had an explosive yield twice 
as large as predicted106.  The radioactive fallout spread over a much larger area than 
expected and led to the evacuation of the Rongelap atoll and the death of one Japanese 
fisherman and sickness of twenty-two others.  The test’s consequences were so horrific 
that thousands of scientists petitioned for a test ban.  Domestic protests increased to the 
point that politicians could no longer ignore them and a test ban treaty was sought. 
Khrushchev wanted to ease tensions and improve relations with the United 
States and selected an area he felt they were closest in agreement, nuclear testing.107  The 
Soviet Union’s main objective was to prevent nuclear proliferation, especially in China 
and West Germany.  It believed these countries posed the greatest proliferation potential 
and threat to its security.  Moscow had provided China with vast amounts of nuclear 
knowledge and technology, and after their relationship crumbled, Soviet leadership hoped 
a comprehensive test ban would prevent China from going nuclear.  Moscow felt the 
proposed U.S. MLF would bring West Germany closer to possessing nuclear weapons,108 
which it felt was a direct security threat.  Washington assured Moscow that if it signed a 
comprehensive test ban, West Germany would not go nuclear.  With hopes that China 
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would be deterred and assurances from the United States about West Germany, the Soviet 
Union moved ahead with test ban negotiations. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis provided the final push for the superpower to 
conclude a test ban treaty.  Both sides made concessions, but on-site verification and not 
enough U.S. Senate votes to ratify appeared to doom the comprehensive test ban treaty.  
Kennedy understood without the necessary votes and Khrushchev’s support, the test ban 
initiative would end.  To save the negotiations he proposed a limited test ban, which 
would eliminate oceanic, atmospheric, and space testing, and Khrushchev accepted.  The 
treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, ratified by the U.S. Senate September 
24, 1963, and entered into force October 10, 1963.109  It prohibited the testing of any 
nuclear device, peaceful or weapon, in any environment except underground.  If an 
underground test is conducted, radioactive debris may not leave the territorial borders of 
the state detonating the nuclear device.  Signatories are not to permit, encourage, or assist 
another country in detonating a nuclear device in any of the prohibited environments.  
The treaty does not expire and permits any state to accede to it.  One hundred and eight 
nations had signed by the end of 1963. 
Kennedy and Khrushchev both wanted a comprehensive test ban treaty, 
but were only able to negotiate a limited one.  Although they did not get a comprehensive 
treaty, the LTBT was not a failure.  It was the first successful big step in cooperation 
between Washington and Moscow in preventing other countries from gaining nuclear 
weapons.  The LTBT is only a modest treaty,110 but it facilitated cooperative efforts 
between the superpowers.  It became a symbol of their ability to overcome differences on 
nuclear matters and made pursuing a nuclear nonproliferation treaty in the future more of 
a reality.111 
                                                 
109Dean Rusk, Sir Douglas Home, and Andrei Gromyko, “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in 
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water ,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4797.htm (accessed 30 July 2004).  This paragraph summarized the main 
points contained in the treaty.  For a complete listing of all signatories to the LTBT, please see the website. 
110Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 186. 
111Ibid., 188. 
29 
b. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
Efforts to create a nuclear nonproliferation regime began in the 1950s by 
Ireland.  The NPT is a modified and amended version of the Irish proposals and received 
unanimous support from the superpowers and the UN.  Its purpose is threefold: to prevent 
nuclear proliferation, lead to eventual nuclear disarmament, and promote the peaceful use 
of atomic energy.112 
Ireland submitted its first nonproliferation regime formula in 1958 calling 
on the nuclear powers not to supply nuclear weapons to other states during test ban 
negotiations.113  The United States rejected it and Ireland submitted a second proposal 
calling for the nuclear nations not to hand over nuclear weapon control to non-nuclear 
nations; it received U.S. support but the Soviet Union abstained.114  The plan was 
amended in 1960 and called for nuclear nations not to pass information to non-nuclear 
states about weapons manufacturing and in 1961, the UN unanimously adopted a revised 
Irish resolution that encompassed many of the previous amendments.  Nuclear states 
were not to relinquish nuclear weapon control or give information about nuclear weapon 
manufacturing to non-nuclear states.115 
In 1961, the United States began negotiations with the Soviet Union to 
make a nonproliferation agreement, but inflexibility on both sides caused the negotiations 
to stall.116  The United States wanted the 1961 Irish formula wording to be the pattern for 
the agreement, but the Soviet Union objected because it would give the United States too 
much flexibility in arming West Europe with nuclear weapons through NATO or the 
MLF.117  The Cuban Missile Crisis and especially the successful Chinese nuclear test 
breathed new life into their efforts.  Tit for tat concessions (the United States gave up the 
MLF and the Soviet Union stopped objecting to previous U.S. nuclear agreements with 
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NATO allies) smoothed out differences between the superpowers and negotiations 
succeeded.  On July 1, 1968 the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was 
signed in Washington D.C.,118 London, and Moscow, ratified by the U.S. Senate on 
November 24, 1969, and entered into force on March 5, 1970.  The remainder of this 
section presents the highlights of the NPT. 
The treaty recognizes two groups of states, those that have nuclear 
weapons and those that do not.  Only five countries, the United States, Soviet Union, 
Great Britain, France, and China, are recognized as nuclear states since they went nuclear 
before January 1, 1967.119  The NPT prohibits signatory nuclear states from transferring 
nuclear weapons, explosives, or control of nuclear weapons and explosives to non-
nuclear states, nor are nuclear states to encourage non-nuclear states to develop these 
weapons.120  Non-nuclear signatory states are not to accept transfer of, control of, or 
manufacturing information of nuclear weapons.  Non-nuclear states must submit to 
inspections by the IAEA to verify peaceful atomic uses are not being diverted to nuclear 
weapons, while nuclear states are not subject to this inspection.  The NPT does not 
restrict signatory states from pursuing peaceful nuclear research, and permits exchange of 
nuclear related material and knowledge for peaceful purposes.  The overall objective of 
the NPT, aside from preventing nuclear proliferation, is to end the arms race and bring 
about complete nuclear disarmament.  Regional treaties establishing nuclear free zones 
are permitted under the NPT.  The treaty is open to all states, and must be renewed every 
five years (it was indefinitely extended in 1995).  Member states must give three months 
notice if they decide to withdraw. 
The NPT has the largest membership of any international arms control 
treaty.  It is an unequal treaty that favors nuclear states and realizes the U.S. and Soviet 
goals of preventing other nations from acquiring the nuclear weapon.121  It filled in the 
deficiencies of the LTBT which was intended to slow down, not prevent, proliferation.  
China’s nuclear success, in spite of the LTBT, made a nonproliferation agreement more                                                  
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urgent than ever before.  The NPT has been successful at slowing down proliferation and 
has prevented the Pentagon’s doomsday forecast of 10 or more countries going nuclear 
by 1970 from becoming reality. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The arms control era was a period of relaxing tensions as the superpowers placed 
the desire for nonproliferation cooperation above distrust for one another.  They were 
able to do this for several reasons.  First, the United States and Soviet Union had a mutual 
desire to end nuclear proliferation since it threatened their security.  They learned 
unilateral efforts were not powerful enough to prevent other countries from developing 
nuclear weapons, and actually led to greater competition (arms race) and instability 
(Cuban Missile Crisis).  They began to pursue bilateral and multilateral agreements to 
improve their security, and by so doing, began the initial steps of cooperation. 
Second, the superpowers’ resolve to cooperate was solidified by two key events: 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Chinese nuclear program.  The Cuban Missile Crisis 
brought the superpowers to the brink of nuclear annihilation, and this near-war 
experience changed their perspective on cooperation.  If they did not cooperate the next 
“missile crisis” might involve many more countries with much less restraint.  China’s 
nuclear proliferation was a common threat to the superpowers and its successful nuclear 
test was the final ingredient to push the superpowers to cooperate.  They realized if China 
could develop a nuclear weapon, other underdeveloped countries would as well.  The 
superpowers set aside distrust in matters of nuclear proliferation and negotiated the NPT. 
Third, the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity and balanced U.S. power.  U.S. 
fears that Soviet aggressions would increase with parity never materialized.  Tensions 
relaxed and mutual dependence forced the superpowers to cooperate with one another to 
improve their security.  Through their mutual dependence, they began to view each other 
as equal partners in preventing proliferation and respect for each other grew. 
The superpowers negotiated four arms control treaties and cooperated extensively 
in preventing nuclear proliferation during the arms control era.  The critical events of the 
early 1960s made cooperation possible, and paved the way for collaborative efforts in 
preventing South Africa from testing a nuclear device.  Although distrust lingered in their 
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relationship, after all it was still the Cold War, Washington and Moscow elevated nuclear 
nonproliferation cooperation to a higher priority.  Their desire to cooperate would be 
severely challenged with the collapse of the Soviet Union; would they heed the lessons of 
the past and continue to cooperate, or once again pursue unilateral efforts? 
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IV. MIXED COOPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Confusion reigned and U.S. citizens stood in shock as terrorists carried out their 
attacks on September 11, 2001.  The smoke had not dissipated before predictions of 
possible radiological or nuclear attacks on American cities filled the airwaves.  How 
could these surreal predictions of nuclear or radiological armed terrorists come about? 
The Soviet Union had the world’s largest nuclear stockpiles, and its collapse left them 
vulnerable to theft.  Attempts to steal this nuclear material renewed fears of nuclear 
proliferation and possible radiological or nuclear attacks.  The enlarging proliferation 
threat has prompted Washington to call for increased international cooperation in 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Although the United States and Russia pledged continued cooperation, the Soviet 
collapse has challenged their commitment.  The balance of power shifted towards U.S. 
hegemony while Russia, contending with economic, political, and social problems, 
drifted off into the shadows.  Nonproliferation is still important to Washington and 
Moscow, and both continue to support the NPT, yet some of their actions are 
questionable.  Aside from helping China, Russia has always been a responsible nuclear 
power and not assisted other countries gain nuclear weapons.  In the post-Cold war 
environment, however, Russia’s desperate economic crisis has driven it to provide 
nuclear assistance to Iran and missile assistance to India and Iran.  The United States 
unilaterally attacked Iraq to prevent it from proliferating nuclear weapons in spite of 
international and Russian protests against such action.  This chapter assesses why 
Washington and Moscow have varied their nonproliferation efforts in the post-Cold War 
climate. 
The background section discusses the effects the end of the Cold War has had on 
U.S.-Russian nonproliferation efforts.  Three different sections will demonstrate the mix 
Washington and Moscow have employed, and the consequences they have had on 
nonproliferation.  The chapter concludes that U.S.-Russian cooperative efforts have 
varied for the following reasons: 1) the balance of power shifted in favor of the United 
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States and it treated Russia as an unequal partner in nonproliferation.  2) Respect for each 
others’ abilities decreased and distrust increased as unilateral efforts became more 
commonplace.  3) Russia’s nonproliferation efforts took backseat to its political 
instability and economic meltdown concerns.122 
B. BACKGROUND 
Immediately following the Cold War, the perception of many U.S. leaders about 
nonproliferation changed.  The main U.S. adversary of many decades had collapsed, and 
its nuclear threat was fading; the United States no longer needed to focus all of its energy 
on national security issues.  Lacking a central threat, the U.S. enjoyed the post-Cold War 
peace dividends by shifting its national security focus from nonproliferation to other 
issues; the nonproliferation focus that remained was torn between multiple minor 
threats.123  The respite from proliferation worries was short-lived as fears of unguarded 
Soviet nuclear stockpiles mounted in the United States. 
Russia did not have as much time to enjoy the post-Cold War euphoria as the 
United States.  The problems that destroyed the Soviet Union carried over to Russia, and 
its leaders were challenged with stabilizing the country.  Russia watched its superpower 
status fade, and with it, its ability to balance rising U.S. power.  Russia was still 
committed to nonproliferation, but it did not have the resources or infrastructure to 
contribute to the fight and what little resources it had were devoted to putting the country 
back on its feet.124 
The U.S.-Russian nonproliferation priorities shifted as the international 
environment changed following the end of the Cold War.  As it became apparent the 
threat of nuclear proliferation was not going away but increasing, the United States and 
Russia varied their cooperative efforts in combating this threat.  The next section presents 
three different methods they used: cooperation, a cooperation mix, and non cooperation. 
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C. MIXED SIGNALS 
1. Cooperation: Cooperative Threat Reduction Plan 
The decreased ability of the Soviet Union to meet its arms control treaty 
obligations prompted the United States to offer its assistance.125  Senators Sam Nunn and 
Richard Lugar proposed assisting the Soviet Union in securing and dismantling the 
nuclear stockpiles spread throughout the fallen Empire.  They felt the minimally guarded 
nuclear stockpiles were “cookie-jars” for terrorists and nuclear proliferators to reach into 
and grab what they needed.  Their efforts brought about the Soviet Nuclear Threat 
Reduction Act of 1991, renamed the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in 
1993.  It had two missions: safeguard and eliminate nuclear weapons in the former Soviet 
Union, and prevent proliferation.126 
To fulfill its twofold mission, the CTR program identified three nuclear 
proliferation threats in the former Soviet Union.127  First, there was inadequate 
protection, control, and accounting of nuclear weapons and material, as pictured in figure 
1.  Second, smuggling nuclear weapons and components was a real possibility.  Third, the 
potential existed for weapons, nuclear components, and nuclear weapon knowledge to be 
transferred.  To counter these threats two objectives were identified: 1) to establish 
“transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons,” left 
in the former republics of the Soviet Union, and 2) assist in preventing weapons 
proliferation. 
U.S.-Russian cooperative efforts expanded to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, 
which had renounced their nuclear weapons and announced plans to accede to the NPT.  
The CTR program assisted in transporting nuclear weapons and material from their 
territory back to Russia.  Their efforts were highly successful with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, but Ukraine caused some concern.  In June 1993, Ukraine decided to keep 
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some nuclear weapons on its territory because of its struggling economy and security 
concerns with Russia.128  Washington and Moscow worked together to relieve Ukraine of 
its concerns.  Following their meeting, a trilateral statement was issued announcing 
Ukraine would denuclearize.  Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are now nuclear free and 
NPT signatories.129 
 
Figure 1.   Soviet-era wax and string seal on nuclear material in Russia (From Department of 
Energy) 
The CTR program’s positive outcomes have benefited both countries.  It 
improved U.S. security and reduced the potential threat it felt from Russian nuclear 
weapons.  Cooperative actions also prevented the emergence of more nuclear powers, 
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along Russia’s borders, by bringing Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine into compliance 
with international nonproliferation regimes.  CTR permitted Russia to fulfill its arms 
control treaty obligations and has provided much needed security for Russian nuclear 
stockpiles. 
2. Fence-Sitting: Missile Proliferation & PSI 
U.S. leaders were concerned with Russian actions that were promoting 
proliferation.  Washington addressed this concern by negotiating with Moscow in 1993, 
to cease missile assistance to India.  Washington feared Russian technology transfers 
could extend the range of India’s rockets, enabling it to strike further with its nuclear 
weapons.130  Yeltsin agreed to U.S. demands, but Moscow did not keep its promise.  It 
continued to transfer missile technology and provided Indian scientists rocket launch 
integration training from one of its leading space launch firms.131  Russia, confronted 
with this breech of agreement, promised to limit its missile technology exports and joined 
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995, but this did not stop its treaty 
violations. 
In 1997, Israeli intelligence notified U.S. leaders of a Russian export deal with 
Iran.  The Israelis revealed Russia had become the main contractor to develop the Iranian 
Shahab-4 missile and had transferred “technicians, wind tunnels, missile test stands, 
guidance systems, and Russian SS-4 strategic rockets” to Iran.132  Russian activities were 
direct violations of the MTCR.  Congress attempted to sanction Russia, but Clinton, in 
the name of nonproliferation cooperation, vetoed the sanction legislation.133  A more 
recent example involves the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
The terror strikes of September 11, 2001, heightened fears the next attack might 
involve WMD.  U.S. leaders felts additional actions were needed to minimize the nuclear 
proliferation threat and introduced the PSI.  President Bush announced it on May 31, 
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2003, in Krakow, Poland.  The PSI is intended to “stop shipments of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide,”134 through 
interdiction.  This proactive program operates within the bounds of international law and 
is designed to work in coordination with existing nonproliferation regimes135 to prevent 
states and non-state actors from acquiring WMD.  Any state may endorse the principles 
of the PSI and participate in its activities.  The PSI currently has fifteen core members 
and over sixty countries agreeing to its principles and participating in its nonproliferation 
activities. 
While Russia remained committed to nonproliferation and stated it has no 
objections to WMD interdictions,136 it withheld support while it studied the initiative.  
Russian leaders expressed reservations that international commerce could be threatened 
by the PSI’s interdiction activities, and that the U.S. Navy would be given unprecedented 
powers to act as international policeman.137  While other nations agreed to the principles 
of the PSI, Russia sat on the sidelines contemplating PSI’s implications and whether to 
support it.  Russia is still a powerful actor in world affairs, and U.S. leaders viewed its 
support as critical to PSI’s success, but were prepared to take whatever action necessary 
to prevent proliferation.  One year after President Bush announced the PSI, Russia 
became one of the core participants.  It has stated its participation is contingent upon PSI 
activities not violating international and national laws.138 
Russia is party to the MTCR regime, yet violated the very precepts this regime 
espoused by exporting missile technology to India and training its scientists.  It also 
waffled on supporting the PSI.  Russia’s support for nonproliferation on one hand and 
efforts that could lead to proliferation on the other send mixed signals to the international 
community about it commitment to nonproliferation.                                                  
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3. No Cooperation: Iraq and Iran 
The first example of no cooperation is the U.S. war against Iraq.  The Bush 
administration accused Saddam Hussein of hiding WMD from UN weapons inspectors, 
and declared it was time to take action.  President Bush felt Hussein had delayed opening 
his country to thorough UN inspections long enough.  His administration laid out its case 
for a UN resolution authorizing war against Iraq and presented evidence linking Hussein 
and Al-Qaeda.  Washington feared if action was delayed any longer, the probability of 
terrorist attacks against the United States would increase, perhaps with Iraqi WMD.  
Russia said it would veto the resolution if it were brought to a vote, and indicated it felt 
UN inspections were working and Baghdad was dismantling its weapons.  It warned 
against U.S. unilateral actions saying they would violate international law.139  The United 
States failed to get the resolution, and despite warnings from Russia not to act 
unilaterally, exercised its self-proclaimed right of preemption and attacked Iraq. 
The Iraq War demonstrated the willingness of the United States to prevent 
proliferation by acting unilaterally, amidst protestation from the international community.  
Its national security trumped bilateral and multilateral consensus.  Undeterred by Russian 
opposition, the United States acted on intelligence reports, now known to be faulty, and 
attacked Iraq to forcefully disarm it. 
Russia opposed the Iraqi war for two reasons: first it needed to protect its 
economy and second it needed to stand up to a growing U.S. power.  Russian leaders 
were afraid a U.S. war on Iraq would further cripple its fragile economy.  Aleksei 
Arbatov, member of the Russian Parliament, said Iraq has acknowledged it owes Russia 
nearly eight million dollars, and a new U.S installed regime might not honor the debt.140  
Russia’s economy is heavily dependent upon its oil industry and its leaders feared a new 
Iraqi regime might flood the market with oil and drive prices down,141 so no matter how 
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Washington tried to sweet talk Moscow, it could not provide enough financial incentive 
to vote for a resolution authorizing war against Iraq. 
The second example of no cooperation is Russian nuclear assistance to Iran.  
Russia agreed to assist Iran in rebuilding two nuclear reactors initially built by Germany 
and damaged during the Iraq-Iran war.142  The United States became very suspicious of 
this agreement, and became even more so after President Bush labeled Iran as an “axis of 
evil,” during his 2002 State of the Union Address.143  The United States suspected Iran 
was attempting to develop nuclear weapons with Russian assistance and condemned their 
actions.  Russia declared it was assisting Iran in “exclusively peaceful, civilian goals,” 
and U.S. accusations were preposterous.144  Russia convinced Iran to accept IAEA 
inspections to verify the reactors were not being used for nuclear weapons development.  
In August 2003, the IAEA found traces of highly enriched uranium, a key component for 
nuclear weapons, and since then, it has documented further violations and noted that Iran 
has not been meeting its NPT obligations.145  To further bolster U.S. accusations, Iran 
recently said the world should accept it into the nuclear club.146  Washington continues to 
insist Moscow end its cooperation with Iran to prevent it from going nuclear.  While 
Moscow maintains its assistance is for peaceful purposes, its opinion has begun to change 
as recent revelations about Iran’s intentions and concerns about its nuclear end goals have 
surfaced.147 
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The U.S. relationship with Iran has been troublesome since its embassy in Tehran 
was stormed in the late 1970s.  News of Russia’s nuclear assistance to Iran brought 
immediate condemnation from the United States.  It placed no faith in Iran’s promise that 
the reactors were only for peaceful purposes.  The United States remembers too well that 
it’s Atoms for Peace program was instrumental in providing India with nuclear 
capability, and does not want another nuclear power to emerge through “peaceful 
programs.”  IAEA revelations that Iran has not been completely honest and has produced 
highly enriched uranium has only increased U.S. opposition to Russian help. 
Russian nuclear assistance is based upon economic, not nonproliferation, policies.  
The Soviet Union was a major exporter of military goods during the Cold War, and 
Russia inherited much of this military production infrastructure.  Russia’s declining 
economy, international political power, and military strength took its toll on Russian 
foreign sales.  Unwilling to lose more business, Russia instituted a risky policy of 
providing nuclear assistance to Iran.  Russia’s actions risked damaging the cooperation it 
had spent years learning with the United States, but the perceived payoff was worth it. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The U.S.-Russian mix of cooperative and uncooperative efforts to combat 
proliferation came about because the new post-Cold War environment challenged their 
willingness to cooperate.  These challenges include: a balance of power shift in favor of 
the United States, decreasing respect and reemergence of distrust in their relationship, 
and Russia’s internal problems.  The end of the Cold War saw the balance of power shift 
in favor of the United States as its global power grew, while Russia’s economic, political, 
and social problems weakened it.  The superpowers had only managed to subdue their 
distrust during the arms control era, not eliminate it, and in the post-Cold War era it 
emerged again.  As distrust increased and U.S. power grew, Washington began to treat 
Moscow as an unequal partner in nonproliferation. 
The United States and Russia have varied their efforts in fighting proliferation 
based upon their interests.  The CTR program was beneficial to both Washington and 
Moscow because they realized the payoffs of working together were greater than the 
drawbacks.  Through their efforts, former Soviet nuclear stockpiles have been relocated 
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to Russia and are more secure, nuclear weapons have been dismantled, and nuclear arms 
control treaties have been honored.   
When the benefits of supporting the United States are not entirely obvious, 
Moscow plays both sides of the fence.  U.S. leadership viewed the MTCR as a vital 
element in preventing proliferation and made every effort to get Russia to join.  Russia 
was assisting India with missile technology, and U.S. leaders believed that convincing 
Russia to join would lower the risk of proliferation.  Russia did become a member, but 
has violated the treaty on numerous occasions by providing assistance to India and Iran 
for economic reasons.  Russia also wobbled on supporting the U.S. PSI program, but after 
a year finally endorsed its principles. 
Washington and Moscow have also acted against the wishes of the other.  U.S. 
leadership has repeatedly warned Moscow to cease its nuclear efforts with Iran, but 
Moscow has so far refused.  In like manner, Washington ignored the threat of a Russian 
Security Council veto and acted unilaterally by waging war against Iraq. 
Washington and Moscow reshuffled their priorities following the end of the Cold 
War to enjoy the peace dividend.  The threat of nuclear war and proliferation seemingly 
disappeared in the excitement of the Cold War’s end, and nonproliferation activities were 
put on the backburner.  As the end of the Cold War exhilaration wore off, the United 
States and Russia realized that the proliferation threat was increasing.  Washington 
elevated the importance of nonproliferation, but Moscow, too tangled up in its internal 
problems, was not able to do the same.  Russian leaders realized the limited resources 
available were more valuable for stabilizing the country than combating nuclear 
proliferation with the United States, therefore nonproliferation efforts took the backseat 
to its political instability and economic meltdown concerns 
These challenges have made it difficult for Washington and Moscow to unite their 
nonproliferation efforts.  Distrust has been elevated above their proliferation concerns, 
and they have chosen to use a mix of cooperative efforts.  The mixed signals from the 
United States and Russia are not beneficial in preventing proliferation.  Their 
nonproliferation commitment is questioned, distrust is increased, and fence-sitters are 
more apt to pursue nuclear proliferation. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear proliferation has always been a concern for the United States and Russia, 
but increasing terrorist attacks, and the prospect of rouge states getting weapons of mass 
destruction, have made this one of the most pressing issues to be resolved.  Efforts to 
prevent nuclear proliferation began with the atomic age and continue to this day.  
Nonproliferation policies have ranged from secrecy and unilateral control to cooperation, 
with internationally cooperative arms controls efforts (such as the NPT) being the most 
successful prevention.  This chapter summarizes the research findings, answers why the 
United States and Russia are using a mix of cooperative and uncooperative efforts, and 
offers policy recommendations the United States can adopt to increase the chance of 
cooperation with Russia. 
B. WHY MIXED COOPERATION 
The collapse of the Soviet Union challenged U.S.-Russian cooperation by shifting 
the balance of power in favor of the United States, decreasing respect and increasing 
distrust, and weighing Russia down with internal problems.  These challenges have led to 
a mix of cooperative and uncooperative efforts between the United States and Russia.  
The historical survey uncovered the following reasons for mixed cooperation.  First, 
distrust between the United States and Russia has increased in the post-Cold War 
environment.  Unilateral actions taken by the United States in Iraq and Russian actions in 
Iran have increased suspicion of the other’s actions.  Cooperation is dependent on trust 
and once that is lost in any degree, cooperation crumbles. 
Second, the United States and Russia no longer view one another as equal 
partners in nonproliferation.  The U.S. hegemony and the plague of Russian problems 
have diminished one’s opinions of the other.  Respect and reciprocity are used less often 
and result in both judging each others’ actions unfairly.  Russia suspects many U.S. 
actions as an attempt to grab more power, while the United States views Russia’s 
diminished ability to contribute as a lack of commitment. 
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Third, not enough effort is made to cooperate.  Unilateral efforts are becoming 
more commonplace in the post-Cold War era because they require less coordination, 
negotiation, and international support.  For these reasons, the United States and Russia 
have found it easier to take unilateral actions to bolster their security than to seek for 
cooperative assistance.  Unilateral actions generally have immediate positive short-term 
gains, but rarely are they in the best interest of cooperative long-term solutions. 
Fourth, willingness to discover concerns and make concessions to resolve them is 
not as important as it once was.  During the arms control era the superpowers were 
willing seek out the other’s concern and make concessions to alleviate them, if possible.  
While attempts have been made in the post-Cold War environment, they have been 
feeble.  Russia has genuine economic and political concerns that will take years of effort 
to resolve.  The few resources it has are dedicated to addressing their concerns, with little 
left over for nonproliferation efforts.  While the United States cannot make these 
problems disappear, it can make a greater effort to understand and alleviate them.  The 
United States does have the power to act on its own, but not every action it takes is to 
grab more power, as Russia feels.  The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States 
have made it more determined to prevent proliferation, and quick, decisive unilateral 
actions are one way to assure its security.  Moscow must understand Washington’s desire 
to protect its citizens is not about gaining more power in the process. 
Last, self-interest has become a key factor in determining whether the United 
States and Russia will cooperate.  If it is in their best interest, cooperation will result.  
However, if one views the problem as benign, cooperation will be very difficult to 
achieve. 
C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Uncooperative Unilateral Policies Fail 
Washington and Moscow adopted unilateral policies in the infancy of the atomic 
age which embraced secrecy and unilateral restriction as key nonproliferation 
components.  The U.S. Congress furiously guarded the U.S. monopoly on nuclear 
weaponry and knowledge by designing a policy to prevent other nations, mainly the 
Soviet Union, from gaining the nuclear weapon.  The policy’s fallacy was exposed in 
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August 1949 with a successful Soviet nuclear detonation.  The uncooperative policies and 
unilateral actions also failed to prevent the nuclear club from expanding as Britain, 
France, and China developed and tested their nuclear weapons. 
Recently the United States accused Iraq of producing WMD and attempting to 
start its nuclear research program again.  Failing to gain international support, and against 
the protests of Russia, the United States attacked Iraq to prevent it from proliferating 
more WMD.  The international community has responded to the aggressive U.S. policy 
by slowly acknowledging U.S. requests for help in stabilizing Iraq.  Although the U.S. 
acted to improve it national security against a perceived Iraqi threat, it is paying the price 
for acting unilaterally and uncooperatively with the rest of the international community.  
The Iraq war confirmed Russian fears that a growing U.S. hegemony had bred an 
aggressive world power, undeterred by international opposition.  It felt the United States 
had devalued its relationship and as a result future cooperative actions will be more 
difficult to build. 
Russia, desperately in need of an economic boost, agreed to rebuild two of Iran’s 
destroyed nuclear reactors.  It continues to reject U.S. accusations that Iran is secretly 
trying to gain nuclear weapons and refuses to acquiesce to U.S. demands to stop nuclear 
assistance.  Russia and Iran have stated the reactors are for peaceful civilian purposes and 
pose no threat to the international community.  IAEA inspections revealed Iran had 
secretly enriched uranium, and recently Iran announced the world should accept it into 
the nuclear club.  The IAEA findings and Iran’s announcement confirmed U.S. 
suspicions and it has stepped up its pressure on Russia.  Washington views Russian 
actions as counterproductive to nonproliferation efforts, and questions its dedication. 
Uncooperative and unilateral actions have deepened the existing distrust between 
Washington and Moscow.  The U.S.-Russia relationship has been plagued by mistrust in 
the past and recent actions by both countries are slowly chipping away at the foundation 
of cooperation that took many years to build.  Although unilateral actions may provide 
short-term benefits, the long-term effects on cooperation are rarely worth the costs 
incurred.  Unilateral and uncooperative efforts will fail to stop proliferation; history is 
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replete with examples that prove these actions breed competition and instability: two key 
ingredients to nuclear proliferation. 
2. Mixed Cooperation Will Ultimately Fail 
Mixed cooperation has not been much of a concern until the post-Cold War era.  
The Cold War escalation era was dominated by uncooperative policies and the arms 
control era was dominated by cooperative policies.  The post-Cold War era is a mix the 
two with consequences that are not yet fully understood. 
The CTR program has been the most productive and successful post-Cold War 
nonproliferation endeavor, but uncooperative actions (e.g. Russian assistance to India and 
Iran and the U.S. war against Iraq), have detracted from the gains.  The PSI has enjoyed a 
growing list of supporters since it was first announced in 2003, but Russia withheld its 
support fearing it would give more power to the United States; its actions could be 
interpreted that checking U.S. power was more important than sending a unified message 
against proliferation.  Fortunately cooperation prevailed and Russia endorsed the PSI 
principles and become a core participant. 
While Washington-Moscow cooperative actions have been relatively successful at 
deterring proliferation, their unilateral actions have not.  Mixed cooperation does not send 
a strong unified U.S.-Russian signal that nuclear proliferation will be punished, rather it 
may lead to a tit for tat exchange between the United States and Russia.  Fence-sitters 
feel less threatened from mixed signals and more willing to attempt nuclear proliferation.  
Additionally, mixed cooperative actions reduce trust and make designing future united 
efforts more challenging.  Mixed cooperation will not prevent nuclear proliferation.  If 
Washington and Moscow continue using it, their cooperative efforts of years past will fail 
because they will concern themselves more with the other’s actions than nonproliferation. 
3. Cooperative Actions are the Most Successful 
The arms control era produced the greatest advances in stopping nuclear 
proliferation.  Washington and Moscow realized they were dependent on each other’s 
assistance and good conduct for their security.  Although an element of distrust lingered 
in their relationship, the threat of a nuclear China, and potentially many other nuclear 
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powers, drove them to work together.  The process of fighting nuclear proliferation 
together promoted the development of respect and reciprocity in their relationship, which 
led to successful cooperative efforts. 
The initial nonproliferation steps were small but instrumental in promoting 
cooperation.  The LTBT was negotiated after both sides failed to produce a 
comprehensive test ban treaty.  Its limitations and the threat of ten or more new nuclear 
powers by 1970, spurred the superpowers into negotiating the NPT.  Their united efforts 
prevented the Pentagon’s worst-case nuclear proliferation forecast from materializing.  
Other arms control treaties were negotiated and entered into that further reduced the 
global nuclear threat and improved U.S.-Soviet relations and cooperation. 
The first case of successfully cooperating to stop nuclear proliferation was West 
Germany.  The openly aggressive Soviet attitude towards the West resulted from its fear 
of potential West German nuclear proliferation.  The Cuban Missile Crisis impressed 
upon both superpowers the importance of concessions and cooperation.  The arms control 
era began with the agreement not to permit West Germany to gain nuclear weapons.  
Although South Africa did not give up its nuclear capability until the 1990s, Washington 
and Moscow were unified in pressuring it not to test nuclear weapons in 1977.  After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine threatened to keep the nuclear weapon arsenal 
it inherited, but was convinced by U.S.-Russian pressure to give them up and accede to 
the NPT.  Cooperative efforts between the United States and Russia have had the greatest 
success at preventing nuclear proliferation. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The historical survey has shown that U.S.-Russian cooperative efforts are 
absolutely essential for successfully retarding nuclear proliferation.  Unilateral efforts are 
counterproductive, breed mistrust, and further hamper future cooperation.  Additionally, 
U.S. and Russian unilateral efforts in the past have failed to prevent nuclear proliferation 
and will not be as successful today.  Although Russia has lost its superpower status, it 
still  wields  a  great  amount  of  power  in  international politics and is able to work and  
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negotiate with countries that will not deal with the United States.  The United States need 
to adjust its attitude about the value of Russian assistance if it expects to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 
The United States can enhance the chance of cooperative efforts by rebuilding its 
relationship with and viewing Russia as an equal partner.  Unequal treatment has led to a 
loss of respect and diminished reciprocity, and recent actions demonstrate this has 
occurred in U.S.-Russian relations as opinions were cast aside, warnings were not 
heeded, and internal fears were ignored.  Treating each other as equal partners does not 
mean differences will be overcome or cooperation will always be achieved, but it will 
improve the chances. 
Russia has endured a tumultuous existence since it re-emerged from the Soviet 
Union, including an economic meltdown and political instability.  The United States may 
not be able to provide the financial incentives for Russia to sever ties with questionable 
countries, but it can gain a greater understanding of Russia’s problems.  Gaining a greater 
respect of Russia and its concerns will provide the United States valuable insights into 
how to increase it chances in winning Russian cooperation. 
The United States must develop a stronger political commitment and make a more 
concerted effort in gaining Russian cooperation.  Cooperation, unlike unilateral actions, is 
challenging and requires a great amount of patience and persistence to obtain.  It took a 
brush with nuclear war to teach the United States and Soviet Union how to cooperate in 
1962.  The U.S-Russian relationship is much friendlier today than it was back then, so 
another nuclear crisis is not needed to establish cooperation, but a strong desire is.  
Efforts to win Russian cooperation will take time and can be full of frustration, but long 
term benefits favor a successful cooperative campaign against nuclear proliferation. 
Coordination must be improved to win the war against nuclear proliferation.  
South Africa and Ukraine are great examples of the success coordinated efforts can 
produce.  They prevented misunderstandings from arising, increased the chance of 
mission success, and convinced South Africa and Ukraine to back away from nuclear 
weapons. 
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Russia needs to be more forthcoming and transparent in the CTR program.  U.S. 
leaders have repeatedly voiced concern that Russia has prevented CTR from being as 
effective and successful as it could be.  Access to certain sites, including Russia’s nuclear 
cities has been denied or limited to U.S. CTR contractors.  By opening these sites and 
allowing CTR to accomplish its mandate, Russia’s commitment to nonproliferation 
would be strengthened from the U.S. point of view. 
Russia should also back away from nuclear assistance to Iran.  The IAEA has 
questioned many of Iran’s nuclear activities, yet Russia continues to support and defend 
Iran’s nuclear program.  The United States is not the only country to express concern.  
The European Union has drafted a resolution calling for Iran to suspend its enrichment 
activities.148  The international community is questioning Iran’s real nuclear intent, yet 
Russia continues to assist Iran.  By withdrawing its nuclear support, Russia may provide 
the necessary pressure for Iran to come clean about its nuclear plans, and step away from 
it enrichment activities. 
Moscow will not agree with every proliferation threat Washington identifies, and 
the United States must accept that.  This means U.S. and Russian leadership must 
prioritize the proliferation threats and seek assistance from each other on the threats they 
have in common and the ones they have defined as the most serious cases.  Two serious 
cases for the United States are Iran and North Korea.  Without Russian assistance, 
especially in these cases, the United States will find it nearly impossible to defeat the 
proliferation problem.  Nonproliferation success has only come when the two have 
cooperated and has failed when  they have not.  Cooperation will not be obtained for 
every threat, but when it is the outcome favors a higher degree of success in preventing 
nuclear proliferation. 
                                                 
148 Tehran Times Political Desk, “Text of EU Draft Resolution on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 
Tehrantimes.com, http://www.tehrantimes.com/Description.asp?Da=9/15/2004&Cat=2&Num=005, 
(accessed 14 September 2004). 
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